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Abstract 
 
The militarily non-allied members of the European Union, Austria, Finland, Ireland and 
Sweden, have undergone rapid changes in security policies since 1999. Looking at two 
states, Finland and Sweden, this paper traces states’ contemporary responses to the rapid 
development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to their historical 
experiences with different types of neutrality. It is argued that by looking at the legacies 
of different types of neutrality on identity and domestic rules, traditions, norms, and 
values, we can better explain how change occurred, and why states have pursued slightly 
different paths. This enhances our understanding broadly of the role of domestic 
institutions in accounting for policy variation in multilateral regional integration, and 
particularly in the EU. In the process, this study also addresses a question recently raised 
by other scholars: the role of neutrality in Europe.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                      Traditions, Identity and Security   
. 
3
                                 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The core difference between members and non-members of a defense alliance lie 
in obligations to militarily aid a fellow member if attacked, and, to this end, share 
military strategy and related information. The recent and rapid institutionalization of EU 
security and defense policy is blurring this distinction beyond the increased cooperation 
and solidarity emanating from geopolitical changes, NATO’s expansion and new-found 
role in crisis management, or, later, the 9/11 attacks. Militarily non-allied EU members 
(hereinafter non-allied)
1 now find themselves treading uncharted territory in a union 
prepared to undertake military operations, and with permanent civil and military 
committees charged with planning and conducting military operations. 
 This paper focuses on two non-allied members, Finland and Sweden. Since 1999 
they have been accepting decisions and engaging in activities previously deemed 
incompatible with official security policies. Some examples include new domestic 
legislation on international military engagements, new multilateral agreements on 
armaments research and procurement, acceptance of autonomous EU peace-promoting 
operations, and a new security doctrine (Sweden). 
Why is this important? Research on the effects of regional integration on small 
states’ policies, security and defense in particular, is limited. Emphasizing the domestic 
institutions guiding policies, this paper sheds light on how developments in the EU, along 
with related security agreements, have significantly influenced both states, moving them 
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beyond economic interdependence to where they are politically, and de facto militarily, 
allied with their EU peers.    
Recent developments in the EU have (again) brought to the fore the question of 
neutrality and its viability in Europe (Goetschel, 1999; Gstöhl, 2002). Focusing on two 
states with different types of neutrality,
2 evident in decision making structures, national 
identity, and citizens’ role conceptions of the state,
3 enables a good comparative study of 
lasting neutrality’s effects. Focusing on the Nordic neighbors can also dispel common 
myths of the two states as political twins, indistinguishable on most issues.  
With strong historical and ideological ties to neutrality most Swedes perceive it to 
be “the only conceivable policy,” and an unbreakable part of national identity. As an EU 
member, Swedish policy makers have been vocal in their opposition to all proposals that 
appear to compromise the option of neutrality. In contrast, Finnish foreign policy 
tradition is more pragmatic and realist-based, rooted in historical quests for survival. 
Identity is not rooted in neutrality the way it is in Sweden, and public influence on policy 
has traditionally been negligible (Tiilikainen, 1998:163-166). Finnish officials exhibit 
great flexibility, and raise few objections to expanding EU responsibilities and NATO 
cooperation, earning admiration among other members.  
Others have also questioned the reasons for why and how non-NATO EU 
members are moving closer to the alliance in policy perspectives as well as systems 
compatibility (Sloan, 2000; Keohane, 2001). Placing the short period of extensive 
developments in Finland and Sweden (1999-2003) in a broader historical context sheds 
light on how variation across domestic institutions (rules, norms, patterned accepted 
behavior), account for different responses to supranational integration. Over time 
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historical experiences become embedded in norms, values, and accepted behavior that 
persist beyond the socio-temporal moment and condition, in other words, institutionalized 
(March & Olsen 1989:167; cf. March & Olson, 1996:30). Individuals frequently find it is 
easier to adhere to familiar world-views and proven strategies amidst contemporary 
events, alternatives and possibilities (e.g. Holsti, 1962; Hermann, 1990; Reiter 1996:71). 
Institutions are thus “sticky,” and resistant to pressures for change (March & Olsen, 
1984:734-749; Pierson, 1996:123-63). They enable certain groups or individuals, and 
their ideas, while constraining others, making certain paths of development more likely 
(Pierson, 2000:484ff; Krasner, 1999:10; Armstrong & Bulmer, 1998:61; Egeberg, 
2002:2).  
In a political organization with multi-level interactions, social, structural, and 
political factors all constitute an interplay of influences. Valuable insights on altered 
perspectives and policy decisions are educed through more than thirty-five personal 
interviews (including repeat interviews), with policy makers, practitioners, and experts, 
from June 1999 through January 2003.
4 Others have presented and analyzed in great 
detail the structures and institutions of the CFSP/ESDP (e.g. Salmon & Shepherd, 2003; 
Ginsberg, 2003). As the focus of this paper is on members’ policy responses, rather than 
a detailed account of EU institutions, a brief introduction will suffice. The institutions 
and developments affecting the states under study will be discussed in the context of 
relevant responses and policy changes throughout the paper.  
 
1.1 ESDP developments 
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Devoid of any real security dimension prior to 1999, the ESDP have since rapidly 
become an intricate part of the EU’s efforts to increase its international political 
influence.
5  The 1970 European Political Community served a consultative role, the 
Maastricht Treaty’s referred to a possible future common defense, and the Amsterdam 
Treaty included the Petersberg Tasks, but the political will to develop the necessary 
institutions was continuously lacking. Prime Minister Blair's personal conviction of the 
need for greater EU engagement led to the 1998 reversal of Britain's 25 year opposition 
to EU defense cooperation. This British alignment with continental states’ preferences 
constituted a critical juncture, the decisive turning point for EU defense integration 
(Whitman, 1999).     
There are now permanent civilian and military committees and common goals, a 
Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) structure (with 60,000 troops pledged, and smaller 
contingents being erected), institutionalized multi-level EU-NATO cooperation, along 
with agreements on exchange of security information and European access to NATO 
assets. EU police operations (EUPM) have been conducted in Albania, and are under way 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. 2003 saw the first autonomous EU military 
operation, in the Congo (June-September 2003), and the inaugural peacekeeping 
operation in Macedonia was successfully concluded in December 2003. The first EU 
“Security Strategy” was published, and joint EU-NATO exercises have been inaugurated.  
The security-political landscape is thus vastly different vis-à-vis 1995, when the 
Nordic states joined. To understand their security and defense policy trajectory we begin 
by looking at the evolution and role of neutrality, following which the discussion turns to 
contemporary policies.  
                                                                                      Traditions, Identity and Security   
. 
7
                                 
 
2. Finnish and Swedish neutrality, decision making and identity 
 
2. 1 Finnish neutrality 
In Moscow, as well as the international community at large, suspicions of Finnish 
survivability and political intentions were prevalent following its 1917 independence 
from Russia. Finland became known as the “threatened country,” (Wahlbäck, 1999), and 
the choice of neutrality was deemed “the most practical, least objectionable policy 
choice.”(Tiilikainen in Grune, 2001). The need for strong, non-partisan foreign policy 
leadership, particularly in Finnish-Soviet relations had resulted in a constitution granting 
the president almost exclusive powers over foreign policy.
6 Consultations with 
parliament were minimal, and at the president's discretion.  
While economically devastated after two wars against the Soviet Union 
(1939,1941), Finland rejected Marshall aid for fear of Soviet reprisals. President 
Paasikivi instead skillfully negotiated a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union (Treaty 
on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance) based largely on Finnish 
preferences. The treaty did not conform to international laws of neutrality, and despite 
Finnish declarations of neutrality skepticism of Finnish policy lingered, giving rise to the 
infamous Finlandization of Soviet policy (Petersen, 1991).
7
Within this environment, relying on constitutional powers and a charismatic 
leadership style, President Kekkonen (1956-81) firmly institutionalized Finnish foreign 
and security policies with the executive. Rarely consulting the government or parliament, 
he in effect personalized foreign policy, setting his own rules of engagement while 
playing-off Soviet and European interests. Decisions were made in response to temporal 
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needs, irrespective of their conformity to international laws of neutrality.
8 With the 
Soviet “bear” kept at bay, the Finnish people accepted presidential secrecy and discretion, 
and came to equate neutrality solely with maintaining independence: as a tool to defend 
the nation-state. Finnish-style neutrality was thus characterized by realpolitik, 
pragmatism and flexibility, without moral or ideological connotations. 
 
2.2 Decision making 
 
The new 2000 Finnish Constitution brought formal institutional change, granting 
the cabinet control of Finnish EU foreign policy, under parliamentary oversight, while 
leaving the president to handle general foreign policy (section 93). Yet existing norms 
and practices persist, and individual leadership still dominates. The novel development 
lies in a dual foreign policy leadership, with the president and prime minister largely 
sharing responsibility for Finnish EU security policy (cf. Raunio & Wiberg, 2001:71; 
Forsberg, 2001).  
With a strong personality, popular support, vast international experience, and 
fervent pro-EU views, Prime Minister Lipponen dominated Finnish EU foreign policies 
from 1995-2003. He declared new EU agreements to be in the national interest, made 
extensive commitments to integration, e.g. committing Finland to sanctions against 
Austria (a decision left intact by the president). Lipponen also moved responsibility for 
coordination between the government and EU representatives to his office in 2000, and 
also expressed unequivocal Finnish solidarity with other members (Lipponen 2000b). 
Contributing to Lipponen’s influence was another historical continuity. With coalition 
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governments consistently formed around two of the three dominant parties (SDP, Center 
or National Coalition), small parties cannot afford to hold radical positions if they wish to 
be viable coalition candidates, and Lipponen used this as leverage to gain acquiescence to 
his EU policy (cf. Raunio and Wiberg, 2001:75-76). A practice carried forth by his 
successor, Vanhanen.
9  
Yet utilizing continued formal powers (e.g. as Supreme Commander, Head of 
State, and a legislative veto), as well as informal channels (e.g. frequent meetings with 
ministers and parliamentarians, use of the press), the president has also retained much 
influence. The president has also historically been the most popular elected official, with 
approval ratings ranging from 70-90%; this continues, adding to the influence of the 
executive (Helsingin Sanomat, 2002c). Current President Halonen has carried forth 
practices instituted by her predecessor Ahtissari after joining the EU. Ahtissari asserted 
his national leadership on EU matters by heading the national delegation whenever 
CFSP/ESDP issues were discussed, and secured a seat at all EU summits (ensuring that 
Finland, as one of two member states, has dual representation, Törnudd, 2001:268-9). 
Halonen continues to attend EU summits, weighs in on security debates, and chairs the 
Cabinet Foreign Affairs Committee, the key foreign policy decision-making body. In 
sum, notwithstanding some changes in formal institutions and committees, what the 
prime minister and president agree upon invariably becomes policy (cf. Forsberg, 2001).  
 
 
2.3 Swedish neutrality  
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Sweden, with a Finnish buffer to the east, and peaceful neighborly relations for 
close to two centuries, has been called “the protected country” (Wahlbäck, 1999). 
Neutrality was adopted in 1812 after losing Finland to Russia. As domestic peace and 
stability ensued, and industrialization brought rising living standards, support for 
neutrality grew. Neutrality was solidified as part of modern Swedish policies in the first 
half of the 20
th century, and there was unanimous parliamentary support for a declaration 
of neutrality at the outbreak of WWI. 
Sweden, unlike Finland, joined the League of Nations. In the extensive debates on 
whether to join the League of Nations (and later the United Nations) opponents launched 
a fierce debate arguing neutrality’s success, and that the collective security obligations of 
respective organization were incompatible with neutrality; a positioned also expressed by 
the League's Council in 1920 (League of Nations Official Journal 1920:308 in Pallin, 
1998:15). However, the Swedish parliamentary foreign policy committee, as well as the 
government, cited cultural and ideological reasons for membership (“to be among the 
culturally modern,” “Swedish traditions of working for peace”) (Government bill 
1920:90: 93-7,106-08, 114 in Cramer, 1998:191). Referencing the likes of Dubois, 
Rousseau, and Lorimer in the bill, the government deemed the League an opportunity to 
bring all states into a collective security arrangement and promote peace (Ibid: 4-8). Yet 
neutrality concerns conspicuously overlay the decision. It was declared that Sweden did 
not perceive itself obligated to partake in any military sanctions (Special Parliamentary 
Committee statement 1920:1:9). 
Following WWII Swedish policy makers refrained from political activities or 
commitments that might jeopardize international recognition of its neutrality. Having 
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rejected invitations to join the discussions on NATO, as well as the Brussels Treaty, 
Sweden initiated the Nordic Council and later joined EFTA. The national defense was 
aimed at deterring a potential attack by making it too costly vis-à-vis possible gains (even 
if the Haag Conventions and the UN Charter allowed for requesting aid should Swedish 
defense fail). Membership in the UN was seen as the first truly world wide collective 
security organization, thus making membership compatible with international laws of 
neutrality and legitimizing collective security declarations and sanctions (Huldt, 1986; 
Andersson, 1996: 87-93; Harden, 1994:147). 
The perceived virtues of neutrality and its appropriateness were evident when 
Norway and Denmark joined NATO. The Swedish foreign minister declared: “our people 
cannot be convinced that their security now requires the abandonment of neutrality as an 
ineffective and out-of-date policy,” (Cramer, 1998:80), a statement which for most 
Swedes would seem equally appropriate in 2003. In 1961 the EC’s perceived federal 
ambitions and role as a complement to NATO were declared incompatible with neutrality 
and Sweden’s domestic social system; a position left unchallenged for three decades.  
During this time the defense department pursued extensive ties with NATO in 
order to prepare for assistance, should a war erupt in Europe. However, these connections 
were never publicly disclosed. In fact only a small clique of policy makers were involved 
or informed, and even fewer knew of their extent (Dahl, 1999; Tunander, 1999). Despite 
later revelations of these ties (1984 and thereafter), support for neutrality has remained 
high. The official justification for neutrality carried clear ideological undertones 
(promotion of the “third-way” Swedish model, neutral broker, third world solidarity, 
neutrality for Finland’s sake), thus institutionalizing, among Swedes and the international 
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community, the perception that neutrality was far more than a realpolitical solution. This 
perpetual identification with neutrality left indelible impressions on identity, as discussed 
below.  
 
2.4 Decision making 
 
With a strict parliamentary system the influence of individual leaders, 
notwithstanding charismatic and well–respected prime ministers such as Erlander 
(dubbed “country-father”) and Olof Palme, have been secondary to party and parliament, 
particularly on foreign policy. There has also been an incremental institutionalization of 
parliamentary powers made decision making by consensus (across all parties) the norm 
for foreign and defense policy. The government is obligated to submit all proposals 
originating in the EU to parliament, and the all-party Swedish EU Committee (hereinafter 
EU Committee) serves as a liaison between the parliament and government. It deals with 
all EU policy areas, as well as the coordination with Brussels-based representatives. EU 
issues are also integrated into the work of parliamentary committees, meaning parliament 
is included in every step of the policy making process. 
 
2.5 Finnish and Swedish national security-political identities 
 
National political identity refers to the socially constructed hybrids drawn 
together through influences from past and present (Gellner, 1983:12ff; cf. Yuval-Davis, 
1997). Nationalism evokes, and then legitimizes, a collective, a group of people with 
perceived commonalties (real or invented), through the use of narratives and symbols, 
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resulting in an identifiable "us" versus "the other,” (Paasi, 2000:101). The results consist 
of shared memories, beliefs, and aspirations which are continuously shaped through 
social institutions and interactions, including education, ceremonies, and symbols. 
National identity is then manifested “when a mass of people have the same identification 
with national symbols…and act as one psychological group when there is a threat to or 
possibility of enhancement of, these symbols of national identity.”(Bloom, 1990:52). The 
external dimension of national identity is people’s perceptions of the state’s self-
placement within international contexts e.g. foreign policy traditions (Gstöhl, 2002:537). 
The latter was particularly prevalent in Sweden where, unlike the case in Finland, 
neutrality became part of the essence of “Swedishness”.
10  
Neutrality was at the ideological core of Swedish identity (af Malmborg, 2002). It 
was believed to have kept Sweden out of wars, enabling the institutionalization of “the 
Swedish model” based on Social Democratic norms of societal conformity, folkhem 
(people’s home, referring to comfort, familiarity, and security), third-world solidarity, 
and an extensive welfare-state system (Wahlbäck,1986; K. Anderson, 2001). This 
identity assumed a perceived superiority, or exceptionalism, especially vis-à-vis 
continental Europe. The latter was seen as dominated by Catholicism, capitalism, 
conservatism and colonialism, all unappealing to a protestant, middle-way, anti-colonial 
Northern state (Dörfer, 1992:600; Anderson, 2001:286-288; Lawler,1997:571ff).  
As the post-WWII environment opened opportunities for international 
engagements in mediation and state-building in emerging democracies, a mental 
correlation emerged between domestic economic and social policies, and neutrality. 
Neutrality now enabled the external manifestation of the Swedish model, or ”third-way,” 
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between unrestricted capitalism and socialism (Elgström, 2000; Dahl, 1999; af 
Malmborg, 2002). Foreign policy became dominated by the projection of Sweden as a 
neutral, impartial, moral custodian, with frequent criticism of both superpowers’ policies. 
The Swedish model was touted to other smaller, distant states, along with extensive 
economic assistance (Waever, 1992:84; Bildt, 1991; Dahl, 1999). This international 
activism, defended with missionary enthusiasm domestically, became the external 
manifestation of national identity, cementing neutrality as the unquestioned security 
political “supreme-ideology” (Andren, 1997:84,105). It virtues have been championed in 
school textbooks, party literature, and the media, becoming a constitutive part of identity, 
where “being Swedish is being neutral”(Opinion, 2002).  
The Finnish case was different. While part of Russia, Finnish leaders, so-called 
Fennomans, increased freedom of action and home-rule by subtly steering internal 
developments past points of potential conflict with the Czar. By the end of the century 
most matters except foreign policy were decided in Helsinki, led by a Governor General. 
Psychologically this was crucial. For the first time the Finnish people felt self-governed. 
Evoking strong national pride was a proliferation of Finnish literature celebrating 
traditions and commonalities, and a social movement promoting the Finnish language, 
culture and ideas (Paasi, 2000:101-03; Jakobson, 1998:17ff).  
School textbooks, political rhetoric, memorials, films, and novels have 
commemorated struggles and nourished memories of endurance and perseverance under 
immense hardships, e.g. the Civil War, two wars against the Soviet Union in 1939 & 
1941, and vast post-war reparations. Successful elite steering amidst economic privations 
and deep-seated international suspicion of Finnish neutrality cemented a strong Finnish 
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nationalism anchored in western values: Lutheran work-ethic, and democracy, but 
without external projection of Finnish structures as a model for others (Tiilikainen, 1998). 
Universal conscription helped cement resilience, pride and a common identity, 
contributing to dominant social norms of respect for authority, a conviction that foreign 
policy is best left to the president, and veneration of the defense forces; all now part of 
“Finnishness” (cf. Paasi, 2000:99-103; Häikiö, 1999:232-3). 
 
3. Finland and Sweden in the European Union: the domestic debate 
 
Economic incentives notwithstanding, the dominant reason for Finnish EC 
membership was security.
11 The tumultuous political situation in the Soviet Union and 
the Baltic states in 1989-91 had renewed security concerns. Though the FCMA was 
invalidated, NATO membership was opposed partly for historical reasons (see above, fn. 
6 & 7), but mostly because it was considered potentially provocative towards Russia. 
Instead, membership in a union with progressively deeper integration was seen as an 
opportunity to enhance security through economic interdependence, and mutual political 
interests and responsibilities; a strategy which has continued since accession (e.g. joining 
the common currency from its outset) (cf. Lipponen, 2000a). By solidifying Finland’s 
place in western Europe it was believed she would never again be left alone to face her 
easterly neighbor.
12    
Swedish incentives were solely economic. By 1990 EU membership was seen as 
the only alternative to revive a sluggish economy and save the welfare state. Compared to 
the 1960’s the bulk of Swedish exports now went to EU members, and EFTA was no 
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longer as beneficial. This necessitated a step away from Sweden’s longstanding attitude 
of aloofness and perceived uniqueness vis-à-vis the rest of Europe (Ingebritsen, 
1997:246; af Malmborg, 2002:124). Knowing that membership was controversial, the 
government’s intentions to apply was long kept secret, only to be presented at a press 
conference as the last proposal on a list of ten “measures to improve the economy.” The 
decisions of other neutrals to apply (Austria and Finland) subsequently helped augment 
government assurances that neutrality would not be affected and economic benefits 
would ensue, making it easier for the major parties’ leaders to justify the change of heart 
to a Euroskeptic constituency. Membership was later barely approved amidst fierce 
opposition centering on neutrality and lingering exceptionalism (Anderson, 2001:288). 
Public opinion is very influential on security and foreign policy matters: e.g. in 
the rejection of nuclear weapons in the 1960s (Andersson, 1996). Among Swedish parties 
the left-wing of the SDP (consistently with electoral support of between 40-52%), along 
with the Left, the Greens, and the Center Party most ardently continue to espouse the 
sanctity of the “Swedish model,” asserting that EU membership has lowered cherished 
labor and environmental standards. The Greens and the Left have gained supporters on 
anti-EU, pro-neutrality platforms, and they see the ESDP as inevitably leading to an EU 
defense alliance where Swedish values and influence are erased (Ruwaida, 1999; 
Hammarström & Nilsson-Hedström, 2000). On the other hand the Conservatives, 
Christian Democrats and the People’s Party have adopted EU favorable platforms in the 
last five years, favoring increased EU responsibilities, as well as Swedish participation in 
the monetary union. The People’s Party also advocates an EU defense, as a “logical 
consequence of European developments and integration.” These opposition parties’ 
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leaderships appear, however, to be out of line with their constituencies. Even as surveys 
show growing support or the CFSP and ESDP (figure 1) (figure 1 here) a vast majority 
also display pervasive EU-skepticism, and public support for remaining non-
allied/neutral spans the political spectrum. This was conspicuously evident as in the 
Conservatives’ 30% decline in the 2002 parliamentary elections, and the overwhelming 
Swedish rejection of the Euro in a 2003 referendum.  
The Euro enjoys solid support in Finland, where the population also exhibits great 
trust in their political leadership, with public approval of foreign policy averaging over 
75% since 1962 (MTSB, 2002). More than Swedes, Finns also increasingly identify, at 
least partly, as Europeans (MTSB, 2002; Tiilikainen, 1998:10ff). More than the other 
Nordic countries, Finland shares with states like Belgium and Germany a more federalist 
vision of the EU. This includes preferences for a strong Commission, and an 
internationally politically influential EU (e.g. Lipponen, 2000b). The latter is believed to 
expand the international influence of smaller members in ways otherwise unattainable 
(Valtasaari, 1999; Lipponen, 2000a). The government is  “continuously re-assessing its 
policies in light of developments in the EU.”(Finnish Council of State 2001: Introduction, 
2.1), and participation in the CFSP is said to strengthen national security (ibid). 
 
3.1 The unintended consequences of a Nordic initiative 
 
The two Nordic states presented a joint proposal on EU crisis management in 
1997. Notwithstanding official rationalizations to the contrary, this was intended solely to 
prevent a common EU security and defense (personal communication, Brussels, 2003). 
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Although originally sketched in 1995, the Nordic memo was not presented until a 
continental initiative aimed at creating an EU common defense by merging the EU and 
WEU (the now defunct military alliance) re-surfaced in the spring of 1997. The 
compromise was thus a direct counter-proposal, and included transferring only the 
political responsibility for humanitarian and rescue tasks from the WEU to the EU. 
Premised on a conviction of continued British opposition to any merger of the two 
organizations, or other defense developments, policy makers in both countries in fact saw 
this as an effective and “safe way” of showing commitment to the CFSP (personal 
communication, Helsinki, 2001, Brussels, 2003; cf. Eriksson &  Sundberg, 2000:9; 
Sandström, 1998:34).  
Two weeks before the Amsterdam summit the Finnish and Swedish governments 
expected the Maastricht treaty wording to remain unaltered, but for the transfer of 
political responsibility for the Petersberg tasks to the EU (EU Committee 1996/97, June 
4, 1997; Halonen, June 13, 1997 in NDFFPY 1998). Yet in the week of the summit, and 
to the surprise of the Nordic ministers, several points in the original continental proposal 
were again placed on the agenda, backed by additional members (EU Committee, March 
21, 1997; personal communications Finnish MFA, 2001).
13 Finland, like Austria, was 
intent on showing that a non-allied state could be a progressive force on CFSP issues, 
including those related to military options,
14 and relaxed its position, displaying the 
flexibility and integrationist tendencies that have come to signify its EU policies. Finnish 
negotiators were prepared to accept a potential merger as well as other proposals as long 
as mutual defense guarantees were not transferred to the EU.
15 Swedish Prime Minister 
Persson did not even mention Finland when reporting to the Swedish EU-committee: “I 
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can conclude that besides Sweden, Britain, Ireland and Denmark oppose an integration. 
To argue against a WEU-EU integration is one of the most important defense priorities in 
Amsterdam.”(EU Committee, June 13, 1997).  
At the summit the Swedish government nonetheless backed away from its total 
opposition and threats of a veto, instead negotiating over symbolic language, seeking to 
avoid references to an explicit merger, with which they succeeded. Nevertheless, when 
the treaty text with appendixes was finalized and distributed a month later the language 
was mostly reflective of the six-nation continental proposal (cf. EU Committee in 
Sandström,1998:36-38; Ojanen et al, 2000: 53-55). References to the gradual 
construction of the WEU as the EU's military component created the link between crisis 
management and defense the two had originally sought to avoid (Barkman,1997).
16
While no immediate concrete EU developments followed, treaty references to 
crisis management had significant and unanticipated consequences in facilitating EU 
defense integration following Prime Minister Blair’s 1998 highly unexpected and 
unforeseen reversal of Britain’s longstanding and firm opposition to EU defense. Thus 
the Nordic compromise in fact contributed to empirical developments the Scandinavian 
countries tried to prevent. The Nordic states have found themselves hard pressed in 
opposing further developments; even if their original intentions were opposite the 
direction the ESDP has subsequently taken. This also shows how even when policy 
makers act rationally, in compliance with socially defined norms and role attributions, 
short time horizons (satisfying imminent constituency concerns), coupled with long lags 
(the complex causal links between decision and outcome), can result in unanticipated 
future consequences of earlier decisions, giving rise to change (Person, 2000:482ff).  
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4. Policy changes 
4.1 Acceptance of autonomous EU operations 
 
Traditionally viewed as the only organization authorized to approve any type of 
military operation, Finnish and Swedish contributions to UN peacekeeping have exceed 
30,000 and 40,000 troops respectively. The recognition of autonomous EU operations to 
be carried out “in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter” without necessarily 
requiring a Security Council resolution, thus constitutes a significant departure from 
previous norms.  
In the spring of 1999, with ample evidence of growing support among the largest 
members for the 1998 British-French St.Malo declaration, the Finnish government 
signaled a positive view of strengthening EU capabilities (Lipponen, 1999a). Following 
“persuasive arguments” at the June Council Summit, Prime Minister Lipponen declared 
that Finland would participate in peacekeeping and crisis management in the EU, as well 
as the UN and NATO (Peel, 1999). Then Foreign Minister Halonen also acknowledged 
that Finnish legislation was out of line with other EU states, and was now convinced that 
“[t]he policies outlined by the [Cologne] summit as well as events in Kosovo compel the 
need to reconsider the Peace Keeping Act,” reversing her previous position (NDFFPY 
2000:134,146).  
Holding the EU presidency as the EU Headline Goals were negotiated (fall of 
1999), both amplified and altered Finnish intentions. The pressure from others to ensure 
progress on defense resulted in more far-reaching agreements than anticipated, both in 
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EU agreements and subsequently in Finnish security and defense (Hufvudstadsbladet, 
1999). Reflective of other members’ high opinions of Finnish conduct, General Hägglund 
was elected head of the EU Military Committee, making a non-allied officer the highest 
ranking military in the EU. Finnish political commitment was also evident as the 
maximum number of troops allowed by Finnish law to serve abroad any time (2,000) 
were pledged to the EU RRF. The government made clear that membership in a political 
and economic union carries the same obligations of solidarity as those in a defense 
alliance (Lipponen, 2000 a,b; cf. Enestam in NDFFPY 2001:104,147-8).
17  
Domestically, as parliament considered a government proposal to overhaul the 
PKA, the various ministers’, and particularly Lipponen’s, public statements and 
commitments naturally limited legislators’ perceived options. MPs have the right to vote 
their conscience even if the government seeks to assures itself of approval through intra-
cabinet bargaining and attempts to enforce party discipline, though if this is not always 
possible. Disappointed with parliament’s diminished role in Finnish EU security policy, 
Finnish MPs attempted to reassert some influence by passing an alternative bill, allowing 
for participation in EU peacekeeping operations, while retaining the need for a UN 
mandates for peace-enforcement operations (Hufvudstadsbladet, 2000; Helsingin 
Sanomat, 2001a). However, if operations are classified as “humanitarian,” Finnish 
participation is unequivocally acceptable, thereby providing decision makers broad 
leeway. Furthermore, premised on the way foreign and defense policies are decided most 
observers, scholars, and practitioners agree that any decision on participation will 
ultimately be based on political rather than legal considerations (Aro, 2000; personal 
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communication, 2001 & 2003), and will be made jointly by the prime minister and the 
president (cf. Forsberg, 2001:4ff).   
Swedish policy makers were surprised by the support for the British initiative and 
the subsequent British-French proposal. In November 1998 the Swedish foreign minister 
made clear that EU actions could never be allowed to infringe upon the UN’s 
predominance: “The standpoint is based on principle. When it is not a matter of self-
defense or duress, a decision by the UN Security Council is required before military force 
may be used.” (Hjelm-Wallen, 1998). The initial drafts of the Cologne EU Summit 
Presidency Report also omitted the requirement of a UN mandate, and made references to 
defense instead of crisis management. The Swedish government responded by 
threatening a veto, citing ideological and domestic political reasons (Dagens Nyheter, 
June 5, 1999). Against the backdrop of Europe’s failure in the Kosovo crisis, as well as 
the Nordic states' own previous proposal on humanitarian tasks for the EU (albeit for 
different reasons as discussed earlier), it was difficult for Swedish policy makers to 
oppose other members who supported the proposals (Schori, 1999b; Herolf, 1999). At the 
same time, a few Swedish ministers and other officials, who previously opposed any 
military role for the EU, were also persuaded by other members of the need for an EU 
force and harmonization of defense policies; sowing the seeds for later policy change 
(Schori,1999a,b; Barkman, 1999). At the behest of Prime Minister Persson a compromise 
wording was found, stipulating that the EU “in accordance with the principles of the UN 
charter.” The phrase later incorporated into the Nice Treaty. 
In what one analyst called “significant wordplay,” the government domestically 
downplayed the declaration’s significance, declaring itself cautiously pleased, as “the EU 
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must assume its responsibilities for crisis management.” (Dagens Nyheter, June 5, 1999). 
The wording was also vague enough to enable Swedish interpretations of the agreement 
as congruent with existing Swedish positions, thereby helping to sooth some of the 
domestic opposition (EU Committee transcripts, July 15, 1999). A senior diplomat 
explained: “with the political situation being what it is in Sweden, with two anti-EU 
parties and the left-wing of the SDP holding on to old views, the rhetoric is 
understandable they [government] play to two audiences”(personal communication, 
2001, confirmed 2003).  
EU-committee transcripts reveal intense domestic reactions to the agreement, 
especially from the political left, reflecting ingrained Swedish perspectives. Accusations 
included: “bullying by larger states,” “abandoning neutrality,” “diminishing the 
UN…contrary to our traditions,” “a militarization of the EU,” and “The government has 
acted as though the Cologne decision poses no threat to non-alignment and [the primacy 
of] the UN, an interpretation it shares with virtually no other EU government.” (June 3-
4, July 17,27, 1999; Ruwaida et al, 1999, emphasis added). Officials who participated in 
accession negotiations referenced previous assurances not to obstruct the CFSP, and, 
backed by conservatives, even stressed the need to compromise and harmonize policies 
with other states to avoid losing credibility, and end up stuck in “a minority of one.”   
In the fall of 1999 other members found continued Swedish hesitancy and 
objections to much of what the Finnish presidency was preparing for the Helsinki 
Summit “irritating and problematic” (Rautio, 1999). Pressure from other states, including 
Finland, and reassurances by EU High Representative Javier Solana that no state would 
be obligated to militarily defend others under attack, convinced the government to drop 
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objections to autonomous EU capabilities.
18 Nonetheless, following the summit Sweden 
appeared to place itself in the aforementioned “minority of one”. Baffled 
parliamentarians heard an interpretation unlike that of any other member government, as 
it was explained how the Helsinki report actually strengthened the need to attain a UN 
mandate (EU Committee, January 21, 2000, emphasis added). Foreign Minister Lindh 
insisted that what applied in 1992 and 1998 remained valid in 2000: “[b]ased on principle 
the government's understanding [of the EU] is that a UN mandate is needed for 
peacekeeping operations.”(ibid), and later: “no developments occurred to precipitate a 
change in Swedish policy.” (Hammarström & Hedström, 2000). 
Meanwhile, the 1999 Swedish Defense Commission (with representatives from all 
parliamentary parties) had recognized the Cologne Declaration’s consequences for 
Swedish defense (DS, 1999:42,47,55,67). In several reports in 1999-2001 it 
recommended extensive reforms and adaptations in order to achieve interoperability with 
other states, while enhancing Swedish capabilities. The rapid developments of the EU’s 
crisis management capabilities were said to necessitate a change in the law on Armed 
Forces for Service Abroad (1992, section1153) to allow the government, without 
parliamentary approval, to make armed forces available for peace-keeping activities 
based on a decision by the EU (DS 2001:44:72, 190). According to the defense minister 
the bill also enables parliament to approve participation in peace enforcement without 
UN mandates. 
Military representatives working in Brussels alongside colleagues from NATO 
states recognized Sweden’s limited potential, and began urging adaptations and reforms. 
Defense reforms initially adopted in 1992, and again in 1996, had only seen limited 
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implementation (Madsen, 1999; Dagens Nyheter, August 1,1999). International 
engagements were made a main priority for the national defense forces (Swedish Defense 
Ministry 2000: 304; Swedish Defense Bill 2000/2001, section 2.1-2.4).  The institutional 
developments in the EU, with increased Swedish commitments of assets and troops, and 
the prioritization of international operations necessitated changes, such as making 
international service for enlisted personnel compulsory. New legislation on mandatory 
international service for career officers was adopted in April of 2002 (Defense Bill 
2001/02). With conscription periods of 7-8 months, more demanding international 
operations, and only 10% of conscripts apt to serve internationally, it is impossible to 
ensure adequate training, and even the sheer number of troops needed for international 
operations (personal communication, 2001; Hederstedt, 2000c; von Sydow, Veckobrev 
34, 2001). As a remedy, a percentage of soldiers can, beginning in 2004, sign multi-year 
service contracts, the first ever professionalization of the Swedish military.  
The government worked with opposition parties on necessary changes, through 
the Defense Commission, thereby engaging in collective political burden sharing on some 
unpopular decisions. Yet there are indications that rapid structural changes in the defense 
system, and the increasing complexity of defense and defense policies, have led to 
feelings of alienation amongst the general public (cf. Lindmark & Stutz, 2001, p.14ff). 
With fewer conscripts less people have personal experience with the total defense system, 
which means less familiarity with the national defense structures, with diminished 
popular support for defense policies as a result (Versktadsgruppen, 2001; Opinion, 2001). 
Politicians now face the new problem of marketing something that used to be compulsory 
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and unquestioned. Unless popular sentiments change, many of the problems the reforms 
intended to remedy may prove less effective.  
 
4.2 ESDP and Nordic relations to NATO 
 
The aforementioned EU development influenced the Nordic states’ relations to 
NATO. Both states are members of NATO’s PfP program and use NATO’s Planning and 
Review Process (PARP) to achieve stated PfP goals (individually tailored agreements 
aimed at NATO compatibility and enhanced capabilities for international peace-support 
operations).
19 The need to improve capabilities and harmonize systems within the EU 
have contributed to vast expansions of both states’ PfP agreements. For the period 2003-
2008 over 30 new areas were added which show significant overlap with the stated goals 
and type of operations planned for the ESDP: planning and defense strategies, strategic 
analysis, military training, doctrine, logistics, consultation with NATO in crises, and 
more.  
Finnish NATO-cooperation has been taken further than Sweden’s, to include 
membership in Enhanced Military Operational Procedures and Host Nation Support. The 
latter in particular is significant as it seeks to ensure that air- and seaports are configured 
to accommodate NATO force structures, making it easier to receive aid in times of crises 
(Helsingin Sanomat, 2002b). These measures constitute a “a significant step from 
previously…the agreements go as far as possible without membership….along with EU 
developments it's all but signing the dotted line.” (Senior Finnish diplomat, personal 
communication, 2003). 
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NATO membership was never considered an option prior to 1999, but aligning 
militarily is now recognized in Finland as potentially being the price for security through 
EU integration and mutual solidarity (Lipponen, 1999c; cf. Enestam, 2002; Helsingin 
Sanomat, February 7, 2002). Officials acknowledge that more than external threats, 
developments in Russia, or NATO’s expansion, EU defense developments (and its 
intricate ties to NATO and NATO standards) make such membership “a logical and ever 
less dramatic step” (Helsingin Sanomat, 2002a), and “a viable option discussed in 
government” (personal communication, 2003). The security doctrine, “Non-allied under 
current circumstances,” leaves open the possibility of accepting a common defense in the 
EU and/or NATO, and a report on the effects of NATO membership is due in 2004.  
Surveys indicate that roughly 60% of Finns, and 50% of Swedes support a 
common EU defense compared to 18 and 21% respectively for NATO, and that even 
Swedish officers now prefer an EU defense over NATO if faced with that option (MTBS, 
2001,2003; FSI, 2001; cf. figure 2 and 3 (figures 2 and 3 here). Given the respect for 
authority and continuously high approval of foreign policy (over 75%), Finns would 
accept NATO membership if the president and prime minister were of such opinion. 
While a referenda is only a remote possibility in Finland, the Swedish voters would 
assuredly decided on NATO membership. Because neutrality was credited with enabling 
prosperity and the social model that followed, its roots are deep and constraining on 
policy makers: “NATO membership would mean submitting to a nuclear weapons 
defense, an ethical moral dilemma for a state with no existential threats to its survival.” 
(von Sydow, August 21, 2001); “Sweden would lack political influence over decisions, 
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rendering Sweden subject to decisions in the U.S. Congress.”(von Sydow, veckobrev  4, 
2000)  
The Swedish position on NATO appears contradictory and increasingly 
unpersuasive to others. While the Baltic states’ sovereignty are said to be protected 
through NATO membership, Swedish membership is argued to potentially weaken 
national security, and compromise sovereignty, by diminishing Sweden’s independent 
influence and role as regional bridge-builder and mediator in conflicts (Lindh, 2003; von 
Sydow and Lindh, 2000; von Sydow, August 6, 2002). R
T
esearch shows how several 
NATO countries (e.g. Canada, the Netherlands, and Norway), participate actively in 
international crisis management (van Staden, 1997; Dahl, 1998), and their nationals serve 
as successful mediators. The lingering Swedish exceptionalism and “large state 
mentality” also appears to place Sweden in a virtual no-man’s-land (Tallberg, 2003). 
Excluded from talks between the larger member states following 9/11, Swedish officials 
was also not invited when Finland and ten other small, current and applicant, states met 
in the Netherlands in 2002 to discuss a small-state alliance in the EU.
 In sum, with ingrained perceptions and expectations permeating Swedish policy, 
and pragmatism dominating Finnish, NATO membership is a more plausible scenario in 
Finland than Sweden. 
 
4.3 European and Nordic armaments policies  
 
 The political will to initiate EU defense cooperation has contributed to a 
politically more favorable climate for cross-country mergers in the armaments industry, 
resulting in numerous consolidations and multilateral treaties on R&D, procurement and 
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armaments deliveries (Schmitt, 2000:56, 2003; cf. Heisbourg et al, 2000). This has also 
prompted major reforms in the Nordic states, including the relinquishing of national 
defense champions in Sweden (with ensuing multilateral interdependence on defense 
material), and European as well as Nordic agreements on arms research and procurement. 
The Swedish defense industrial sector, state-owned and heavily subsidized, 
expanded rapidly from the 1940s, eventually becoming the fifth largest in Europe. Self-
sufficiency in arms was aimed at bolstering security political credibility in neutrality, and 
state ownership was said to be critical to national security interests as late as 1998(DS, 
1998:17ff). Nonetheless, by the mid-1990s spiraling defense costs and state deficits were 
rapidly making subsidies (direct and indirect, through excessive ordering) increasingly 
unviable. A year of inactivity caused labor unions to publicly accused the government of 
jeopardizing jobs, the industrial base, and technological know-how, thus posing a direct 
threat the future of the entire defense industry (Antoniusson, 1999; cf. Ericsson, 1999).  
An opportunity to retain domestic production and know-how arose in 1999 when 
Sweden was invited to join five EU-NATO states, the four largest armaments producing 
nations in Europe and Spain, in an agreement on defense industrial cooperation.
20 The so-
called LoI aims to improve efficiency and cost-effectiveness on defense procurement and 
R&D through state-state and public-private collaborations.
21 A senior Swedish Defense 
Ministry official acknowledged, 
the emergence of the ESDP significantly pushed the LoI, and [for Sweden]to have 
said no to LoI had not been possible…also, transnational defense corporations are 
so strong that they can play individual countries against each other, particularly 
smaller states, and so LOI is also a way to counter these forces. (personal 
communication, 2001). 
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The opportunities afforded by the LoI (e.g. technological developments and 
multilateral projects such as the European Meteor Missile and a European air combat 
system), amidst economic problems, led to an easing of rules on foreign investments and 
ownership (Antoniusson, 1999; personal communication, 2001). During a brief four year 
period all Swedish companies were acquired by predominantly European, but also some 
American, companies. Most industry representatives, realizing that an 
internationalization of the domestic defense industrial base was the only means of 
survival, actively began pursuing European and international cooperative projects (Folk 
och Försvar, 1999).  
The government insisted that neither LoI stipulations, nor the sale of industries, 
would diminish independent decision making or neutrality policies. However, although 
an economic and technological life-preserver for Swedish industry, the LoI carries 
policy-altering implications. The state must now consider the interests of foreign owners 
as well as stipulations in on export regulations. The LoI white-lists of accepted export 
recipients is classified, yet it is reported to be “largely dictated by the largest signatories.” 
(BASIC, 2000:3ff). The other members (with partial exception for Germany) all have less 
stringent export regulations than Sweden, whose laws are largely based on the 1906-1907 
Haag Conventions. The LoI rules are also more lenient the 2000 EU Code of Conduct on 
Arms Exports; a clash not yet resolved. LoI participants and observers alike agree that if 
Sweden is the exit-country in a multilateral project, political pressure and economic 
necessity will force Sweden to accept export recipients previously banned under Swedish 
regulations (British official referenced in BASIC, 2000:3; personal communication, 2001 
& 2003). On the up side, thanks to the LoI and EU-NATO security agreements, Sweden 
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also received NATO status for its arms exports. This opens new markets for Swedish 
subsidiary companies, while saving jobs domestically and increasing export revenue. 
Swedish options are now locked in by previous decisions on industry ownership, 
LoI export stipulations, constituency demands on retaining production domestically, and 
the desire to retain technological know-how. There are few politically or economically 
feasible alternatives to a complete harmonization with other signatories’ policies. Two 
domestic legislative amendments in 2000 constituted the initial steps towards easing 
regulations and adopting French and British export rules (Foreign Affairs Committee 
2002:4). The fall 2001 sale of robots to India, at the time engaged in fighting in Kashmir, 
was also a first empirical sign of a new Swedish approach. 
The Finnish military has always relied upon imports, complimented by a small, 
specialized domestic production by state-owned industry. In 1997 over 65% of Finnish 
defense industries where consolidated into the state owned aerospace and defense group 
Patria Industries. EADS subsequently acquired 27%, with British Areo Space currently 
seeking a similar share. In 2001 NATO-LoI treaty signatories began to bring discussions 
on projects and legislation into the EUMC and PSC, to the dismay of many Swedish 
officials hoping to keep armaments cooperation outside the EU framework. Finland, not 
yet party to the LoI, welcomed the development. Common procurement policies, and an 
integrated and internationally competitive European armaments industry, “benefits a 
partner like Finland in its own armaments development and defense reform work” 
(Möttölä, 2001:136-7), by increasing international investment and deepening mutually 
beneficial interdependence. The 2003 agreement on a European Armaments Agency 
(Tessaloniki EU Council Summit in 2003), followed intense promotion by the larger EU 
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NATO-members, with wide-spread (including Finnish) support, and unenthusiastic 
Swedish acquiescence.  
On the strategic policy side all four Scandinavian states signed an agreement on 
defense material cooperation in June of 2001. In tough negotiations the two non-allied 
states had to concede positions as Denmark and Norway insisted on certain stipulations to 
fit with NATO policies (personal communication, June, 2001). Sweden, with the largest 
armaments industry, had most to loose from a failed agreement, while Finland, the 
treaty’s main proponent, had few problems with the demands. The treaty in many ways 
exceeds the LoI and EU treaty obligations. It includes admission of armaments 
interdependence and, significantly, obligates all signatories to ensure uninterrupted 
armaments deliveries in crises and war (preamble and sections 2.1,2.2, 2.4), making 
neutrality in war a practical impossibility. The latter was not addressed by the Swedish 
government who instead heralded the treaty as vital to guaranteeing armaments 
deliveries, preserving political independence, as well the option of neutrality. In other 
words, the familiar rhetoric necessitated by the domestic constituency and political 
structure. Finnish officials and industry representatives declared the agreement beneficial 
to regional and EU integration, and conducive to strengthening Nordic capabilities. 
 
4.4 Flexible EU defense Integration and the solidarity clause 
 
Flexibility in CFSP/ESDP enjoys overwhelming support in most states and is 
included in the draft EU constitution, despite Swedish opposition in the Convention 
working groups and the Council (Kvist, 2002; Hagman, 2002:24). Officially Swedes 
argue that establishing a core group where armaments cooperation, strategic goals and 
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international operations are decided shows internal splits, leading to a system of “class A 
and B members,” thus inhibiting rather than strengthening the Union’s international 
credibility (EU Committee, December 8 &10,11, 2000). Unofficially, diplomats admit 
that retaining uniform pace is a preferred strategy to inhibit further development towards 
a common defense alá NATO. However, EU enlargement, an institutional change heavily 
promoted by (particularly) Sweden, has made flexibility unavoidable in order to prevent 
impasse on ESDP, and with that the “worst case scenario”: a continental-led European 
defense outside the Union. This would further strain Transatlantic ties and American 
presence in Europe, contrary to Swedish preferences (Hedström, 2002).  
The Finnish preference for flexibility emerged in 2000 as a result of particularly 
French EU representatives “continuously and convincingly” arguing the case in EU 
committees (personal communication, 2001). Flexible defense integration is said to 
benefit Finland even if she decides not to join the initial group, as closer cooperation 
between some members fosters interdependence and solidarity across the Union, 
diminishing the potential for unilateralism (Tuomioja, 2001).  
Swedish acquiescence to the EU solidarity clause as proposed in the EU 
Constitution (for non-man made crises and terrorist attacks), was premised on the 
omission of automatic assistance. Yet officials admit that practically, political pressure to 
aid a fellow member in a crisis would necessitate Swedish assistance (Lindh, 2002). 
Finnish officials deemed the clause unproblematic. It fits with views of security through 
integration and emphases on solidarity. Officials have explicitly stated the unfeasibility of 
remaining aloof should a crisis or war occur in or around the EU (Lipponen, 2000b; 
Vaahtoranta in Helsingin Sanomat, 2003). The Finns have indicated that “the EU should 
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take all means available to prevent and resolve disputes and restore peace.” (Lipponen, 
2000b; cf. Finnish Council of State 2001:7-8), along with a willingness to apply military 
means to aid others “if asked.” (Enestam in Helsingin Sanomat, November 2, 2001; cf. 
Helsingin Sanomat, 2004).   
 
5. Institutional web, adaptations, and concluding thoughts  
 
Joining the EU entailed jumping onto a moving political train, and Finland and 
Sweden have clearly embarked on paths of an incremental Europeanization of security 
policies. New perspectives have come from the European group of statesmen and 
officials to which Nordic political leaders are closely tied through a complex web of 
agreements, package deals, solidarity, and loyalty. 
Some Swedish officials insist that “[t]he Finns are overshooting. Finland has gone 
out of its way to demonstrate its eagerness to strengthen the administrative bodies of the 
EU and the path towards a federation” (Karismo & Sipilä, 2000); while Finnish officials 
maintain “We [Finns] go along with everything that does not directly contradict national 
interests, even if we do not always choose to participate in all aspects… unlike Sweden 
who opposes everything it does not like.”(personal communication, Brussels, 2003). 
Recognition of others’ favorable views of Finland, its willingness to adapt and 
compromise, was implicitly confirmed by Foreign Minister Tuomioja after the December 
2003 Brussels Summit, when he argued that Finland must at times “put its foot down lest 
it never be asked its opinion,” with expectation that it will be a constant “yes-sayer” 
(Hämäläinen, 2003). 
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Even with reforms, the beliefs and images other states’ policy makers hold of 
Swedish policy, engrained through historically vivid and persistent espousal of Swedish 
neutrality, still persist. Questions of Swedish security political goals and doubts of its 
commitments to the ESDP are ubiquitous and perpetuated by contemporary rhetoric, such 
as lingering references to neutrality in the new security doctrine (personal 
communication, 2001, 2003). Strong ties between neutrality and national identity 
explains why the idea of Sweden as a neutral power in world affairs still occupies an 
important position in the domestic Swedish security debate (Kronsell & Svedberg, 
2001:155). These ties, and previous vows to “never change our security policies” (Prime 
Minister Carlson in Eneberg, 1995),
22 are also the predominant reasons why the 2002 
Swedish revision of the security doctrine is a lengthy and convoluted declaration (140 
words) with retained references to the virtues of neutrality, despite acknowledging 
neutrality’s inapplicability given recent years developments in the EU.  
The meaning and influence of national identity has thus been brought to the fore, 
and its continued importance for guiding security policy making has been displayed. 
Compatibility between Swedish and EU policy agreements has been furthered by 
strategically avoiding certain language (peace enforcement, EU autonomy), while 
emphasizing other acceptable words (UN, peace promoting), to appear as maintaining the 
same policy positions, thereby satisfy the domestic electorate (e.g. Holmström, 2000a). 
Non-alignment and neutrality are inseparable to most Swedes, and all changes must be 
explained carefully to the public to minimize alienation (Hjelm-Wallen, in Dagens 
Nyheter, February 8, 2000). The Swedish public appears to have accepted and 
internalized most developments (of which they are aware) within the ever more flexible, 
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and conceptually stretched, neutrality framework, while making perfectly clear that 
NATO membership is unacceptable and something Sweden “should not be part of” 
(Opinion, 2002). Reflective of an intrinsic belief that Sweden “is neutral,” 55% of 
respondents asked to explain why explained  “because Sweden is non-aligned and 
neutral”(ibid). Defense von Sydow elaborated on neutrality’s lingering appeal: 
Most people perceive neutrality to be the only acceptable policy position for 
Sweden and find it difficult to perceive of Swedish soldiers engaged in military 
combat operations outside Swedish territory, even in peace-enforcement 
activities. European defense and security policies affects this crucial point in the 
attitude of the Swedish public and this is a very important factor for politicians 
and high ranking officers to remember and relate to. (von Sydow, 2001). 
 
The aforementioned constraints are less prevalent in Finland. Continuity and 
compatibility means continuously seeking security under presidential-prime ministerial 
leadership. The external presentation of Finnish policies in the EU has been seamless, 
and confidence in, and admiration for, Finnish EU policy is high among other members. 
Finland has also contributed experts and financial assistance to the reconstruction effort 
in Iraq and the EU’s first out-of-area operation, in the Congo. As the first ever non-
NATO member, Finland assumed operation command of the NATO-led operation in 
Kosovo in the spring of 2003; another recognition of its pragmatism and improved 
capabilities. 
 Staunch political commitment, a pragmatic approach to integration, and the ease 
with which EU-Finnish institutional compatibility has been achieved, has earned Finland 
a reputation as a “model member” (two officials, personal communication, 2003), 
graduating from its previous designation as a “model pupil”(Ojanen, 2000:3). References 
to a credible rather than independent Finnish defense (adopted by Lipponen as a 
recognition of the interdependent nature of defense strategy and arms), remains intact in 
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Finland’s upcoming security report (2004), as does the option of NATO membership, 
pending developments in the EU.  
 
5.1 Conclusion and further research 
 
Repeated interpersonal interactions, mutual interdependence (economic and 
political), arguments of shared responsibilities and common objectives, and the 
shamefulness of free-riding, promoted new security perspectives and perceived practical 
defense political needs in the Nordic states. This in turn promoted an increased 
acceptance of communal values, domestic structural adjustments, and harmonization of 
security policies. EU declarations and the consolidated treaty, the solidarity clause in the 
EU (draft) Constitution, and the Nordic Armaments Agreement, have incrementally 
combined to limit available security policy options, lending credence to theoretical claims 
that wherever existing institutions and repeated interactions provide both opportunities 
and constraints beyond simple inter-state bargaining, the political costs of not showing 
solidarity and burden-sharing are high enough that states are likely to adapt and 
compromise even as they formally posses a veto. The political solidarity to which 
members subscribe has become de facto binding, and the political costs of abstaining 
from providing assistance in terror attacks, natural disasters or military operations is too 
high.
23
With further EU integration and strengthened ties to NATO continued adaptations 
can be expected. We have seen how domestic institutions continue to guide policy 
makers as they shape the image of policy decisions to fit accepted behavior, in effect 
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frequently engaging in conceptual stretching of neutrality. As the ESDP continues to 
unfold, with new neutrals in the EU, expanded research should focus on how the content 
of neutrality as well as national identity continue to undergo incremental adaptations.  
Of interest is also whether, as preliminary research indicates, the more pragmatic 
current members (Austria and Finland) continue their current path and join the core of 
EU defense, as well as NATO, in the near future. In 1999 the Austrian parliament voted 
to modify their constitution to allow for participation in EU operations, making future 
decisions on Austrian actions strictly political (Gustenau, 2000, p.33 in von Niederberger, 
2001, p.15, fn. 43). Security debates intensified in 2000-2002, a majority of Austrians 
support common EU foreign and defense policies, and political trends are similar to those 
found in Finland. If both states pursued these paths further this would not only strengthen 
the argument of the influence of institutions posited in this study, but also contribute to 
the broader argument in the international relations literature of how regional integration 
forge common policies through institutionalized cooperation. 
 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 3. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 The term used varies with the analyst, scholar, and even government official writing or speaking on the 
issue, e.g. Torstilla (2000) or Ahern (2000). Whereas the Nordic states officials frequently use “non-
aligned,” Finland and Sweden are still referred to as neutral (Keohane, 2001; Sloan, 2000; Moravscik & 
Nicholaidis, 1999), militarily non-aligned (Andren, 1998, Herolf,1999), post-neutral (Dörfer, 1996; 
Gustenau, 1999), militarily non-allied (Dahl,1999; Jakobson, 1999), or alliance-free (Wahlbäck, 2000). 
2 Finnish neutrality can be categorized as partly de jure, partly de facto yet flexible, pragmatic, politically 
isolationist. Swedish neutrality is de facto, yet rigid with an ideological international activism. Austria’s is 
also de jure, rigid, with a focus on confining the spread of conflict. Irish neutrality is de facto, rigid, with 
ideological foundation. These typologies draw upon arguments by  Cramer (1998), Ojanen, Herolf , & 
Lindahl, (2000) but the classifications are my own and further developed in Eliasson (2004). 
3 By ideological neutrality is meant its role in national identity as the policy developed, peoples’ role 
conception of the state, and international engagements based on idealism tied to neutrality (impartiality, 
fairness, equality) and projections of domestic socio-economic structures. The 1907 Haag Conventions 
remain the core aspect of the law of neutrality, albeit codified by 20
th century international customary law. 
Indicative of fluctuating policies the meaning of neutrality has become increasingly context dependent and 
individualized.  
4 These took place at the Foreign Ministries and Defense Ministries in Finland, Sweden and Britain, as well 
as their embassies and the military headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. 
5 “To this effect the EU must be able to apply the whole gamut of available instruments, from conflict 
prevention measures of various kinds to military action; enhance military capabilities and interoperability, 
and improve the institutional arrangements to achieve these objectives.” (Cologne EU Council Conclusion 
1999, par.1,2; 1999 Cologne Presidency Conclusions, par. 3,4). The intense progress on the ESDP is 
reflected in over 30 new treaty articles, EU Council declarations and regulations, and bilateral declarations 
in 1998-2001 (Rutten , 2001). For more on ESDP see e.g. Howorth (2002), Eliasson (2003). 
6 The president was also given the post of Supreme Commander, he approved the government and could 
dissolve parliament at will. (e.g. Forsberg, 2001:4ff). 
7 Western policies left deep and lasting resentment towards the alliance. Foreign observers declared Finnish 
independence “a lost cause” [and] “Finland may not be a Soviet satellite, but sooner or later this oversight 
would be put right”(Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, 1945, in Bullock, 1983:513-15 in Jakobson, 1998). 
Roosevelt and Churchill's interpretations of the Yalta agreement was that neighboring states be run by 
“friendly governments that respect Soviet security interests.” The United Kingdom and the U.S. also made 
clear they would not assist Finland in case of a Soviet attack. Later Henry Kissinger was one of the few 
Western statesmen who recognized Finnish style “realpolitik neutrality,” expressing support for its 
conservative international outlook, an understanding of Finnish abstentions in UN votes on matters related 
to the two blocks, and praise for its restraints under pressure from Moscow (Jakobson, 1998:74-76, 96).  
8 On the one hand this skepticism and Soviet doubts (Stalin dismissed the concept of neutrality and was 
concerned only with policies not opposing Soviet interests) provided the president greater leeway to pursue 
policies not otherwise available or acceptable under international standards of neutrality (e.g. German 
support in 1919; SAS troops training Finnish troops in 1944; the lease of the Porkkola base to the Soviet 
Union and free transit through Finnish territory). On the other hand the treaty forced Finnish policy makers 
to divorce security policy from the country's ideological, cultural and economic ties to the west (Jakobson, 
1998:74) 
9 The foreign policies and institutional arrangements put in place under Lipponen remain intact as 
Vanhanen (Center Party) became prime minister in May, 2003. In fact, the president’s powers, because of 
her vast international experience, have increased.  
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10 For more elaborate discussion on Finnish national identity see e.g. Passi (2001) or Jakobson (1998); on 
Swedish national identity  see e.g. af Malmborg (2002) or Wahlkback (1986). 
11 Citing his own memo from 1993 Finnish President Koivisto stated, “[t]he strongest reason for seeking 
EC membership seemed to me to lie in the realm of security policy. The economic reasons were 
secondary.” (Koivisto, 1997:246; cf. Ojanen , Herolf & Lindahl, 2000: 79). 
12 Cf. four government reports by the Council of State 1988-1992, which if examined in sequence, show 
increasing elite support for, and emphasis, on joining the EC/EU for predominantly security related reasons 
but also economic benefits. 
13 The surprise for Finnish-Swedish negotiators also indicate, contrary to intergovernmentalist theory 
(Moravscik & Nicholaidis,1999: 62ff), that there was uncertainty  about other states' positions heading into 
the final negotiations. Furthermore, the compromise was not the least common denominator, and members 
refrained from using their veto on an important national position.  
14 Austria was the first of the new non-allied members to hold the EU presidency (Fall of 1998) and wanted 
to appear constructive and supported the six-nation proposal. Furthermore Finland generally prefers greater 
integration and a strong Commission as a way of strengthening small states’ influence in the EU.  
15 That Finland was less concerned with wording as long as it excluded direct reference to WEU integration 
is supported by diplomatic sources in Karismo & Sipila (2000); cf. Prime Minister Lipponen, June 12, 1997 
(NDFFPY, 1998) who interpreted that “nothing was proposed which states had not already committed to in 
the Maastricht Treaty,” (cf. President Ahtissari, June 17, Ibid). 
16 Transfer to the EU of all but the WEAO, article V, and the WEU assembly took place January 1, 2002. 
Even if actors operate under conditions of “bounded rationality” the future consequences of contemporary 
decisions are even less clear when placed in the larger novel context of a political organization such as the 
EU, where the normal complexity and fluidity of political decision making are manifold, making it difficult 
to asses the impact of decisions in the EU and appropriate domestic responses and links to effects on 
security and social life. 
17 Officials confirm that Finland, not wishing to be seen as irresponsible or obstructionist, would likely not 
abstain, and certainly not object to, EU operations irrespective of UN mandates (personal communication, 
2001 & 2003).  
18 “While officials cannot, for domestic political reasons, be as clear publicly, they recognize the 
significance of what is happening and the need to adjust policies and practices accordingly[and] this is an 
EU project...we are all responsible.” Another senior diplomat noted,  “despite rhetoric in the capital …a 
defacto EU defense is emerging. If the EU acts they [Nordics]will partake regardless of UN mandate.”
 
(personal communication, 2001and 2002). 
19 NATO is the only organization with standardized criteria for military technology, strategy and related 
areas. Eleven of fifteen (now nineteen out of twenty-five) EU states are members of NATO and pushed for 
using this standardization for the ESDP. 
20 LoI is short for Letter-of-Intent, signed in 1998 by France, U.K., Germany, Italy , Spain, Sweden. In 
2000 the LoI was signed into a treaty  entitled "Framework Agreement Concerning Measures to Facilitate 
the Restructuring and Operation of the European Defence Industry.” Signatories account for 98.5 % of all 
EU defense industrial output.   
21 68% of Swedish weapons sales went to the EU in 2001; the Finnish equivalent was 78%.  
22 In 1999 the government had no intention of changing security policy, yet by 2000 it invited parties to 
negotiations, and in 2002 the new doctrine was accepted, which includes  “the option of neutrality in 
conflicts served us well ….. through our participation in the European Union we share a common solidarity 
which aims at preventing war on the European continent.” (Government, 2002). 
23 While never totally assured, neither are the mutual obligations in NATO automatic, as pointed out by 
Finnish Foreign Minister Tuomioja (December, 2002), and shown in the case of Turkey in the Iraq war. 
 